Field Maintenance Equipment --> Field:
field equipment commands
Definitions
field equipment commands (Information Flow): System-level control commands issued to field equipment such as reset and remote diagnostics.
Field Maintenance Equipment (Source Physical Object): 'Field Maintenance Equipment' represents the portable equipment used by field personnel to locally troubleshoot, initialize, reprogram, and test infrastructure equipment. It may include a laptop, specialized diagnostics tools, or any other general purpose or specialized equipment that is interfaced locally to infrastructure equipment to support maintenance and repair.
Field (Destination Physical Object): This general physical object is used to model core capabilities that are common to any piece of field equipment.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
None |
Communication Solutions
- US: NTCIP Generic Device - SNMPv3/TLS (6)
- US: NTCIP Generic Device - SNMPv1/TLS (7)
- (None-Data) - Guaranteed Secure Internet (ITS) (32)
- US: NTCIP Generic Device - SNMPv1 (33)
Selected Solution
Solution Description
ITS Application Entity
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Click gap icons for more info.
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Mgmt
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Facilities
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Security
IETF RFC 8446 |
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TransNet
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Access
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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
Characteristic | Value |
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Time Context | Recent |
Spatial Context | Adjacent |
Acknowledgement | True |
Cardinality | Unicast |
Initiator | Source |
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | False |
Interoperability | Description |
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Local | In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides. |
Security
Information Flow Security | ||||
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Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
Rating | Low | Moderate | High | |
Basis | Commands could be sensitive, however this flow is local, meaning the Field Support Equipment is proximate to the ITS Roadway Equipment. Thus the risk of interception should be low. There may also be constraints on this flow that require this information to be transmitted in the clear. | Commands to ITS Roadway Equipment must be authenticated as having come from a source entitled to issue that command, or roadway equipment may be comprimised. Similarly, commands and configuration must be guaranteed to be correct; not manipulated midstream or corrupted, or the roadway equipment may be mis-configured or compromised. | Without the ability to locally diagnose, operate, update and configure ITS Roadway Equipment, the equipment is effectively out of control and would have to be taken out of service. |
Security Characteristics | Value |
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Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | False |