ITS Roadway Equipment --> Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment:
field equipment status for METR
Definitions
field equipment status for METR (Information Flow): This flow provides reports from field equipment (sensors, signals, signs, controllers, etc.) indicating current operational status. Certain METR rules and corresponding physical rules will rely on the supporting data provided by field equipment. For example, a roadside sensor can be used to detect precipitation, which might be defined to activate a rule for a lower speed limit. This infrastructure-sourced supporting data can be provided to a CV RSE and then transmitted to METR user systems so that they can become aware of current status of rules.
ITS Roadway Equipment (Source Physical Object): 'ITS Roadway Equipment' represents the ITS equipment that is distributed on and along the roadway that monitors and controls traffic and monitors and manages the roadway. This physical object includes traffic detectors, environmental sensors, traffic signals, highway advisory radios, dynamic message signs, CCTV cameras and video image processing systems, grade crossing warning systems, and ramp metering systems. Lane management systems and barrier systems that control access to transportation infrastructure such as roadways, bridges and tunnels are also included. This object also provides environmental monitoring including sensors that measure road conditions, surface weather, and vehicle emissions. Work zone systems including work zone surveillance, traffic control, driver warning, and work crew safety systems are also included.
Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment (Destination Physical Object): 'Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment' (CV RSE) represents the Connected Vehicle roadside devices (i.e., Roadside Units (RSUs)) equipped with short range wireless (SRW) communications technology, as well as any other supporting equipment that leverage the RSU and are not described by other objects (e.g., a local roadside processor). CVRSE are used to send messages to, and receive messages from, nearby vehicles and personal devices equipped with compatible communications technology. Communications with adjacent field equipment and back office centers that monitor and control the RSE are also supported. This device operates from a fixed position and may be permanently deployed or a portable device that is located temporarily in the vicinity of a traffic incident, road construction, or a special event. It includes a processor, data storage, and communications capabilities that support secure communications with passing vehicles, other field equipment, and centers.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
- None
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
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Communication Solutions
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US: NTCIP Generic Device - SNMPv3/TLS (5)
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(None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS) (43)
Selected Solution
US: NTCIP Generic Device - SNMPv3/TLSSolution Description
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ITS Application Entity
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Mgmt
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Facilities
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Security
IETF RFC 6353  IETF RFC 9456 |
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TransNet
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Access
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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
| Characteristic | Value |
|---|---|
| Time Context | Recent |
| Spatial Context | Regional |
| Acknowledgement | True |
| Cardinality | Unicast |
| Initiator | Source |
| Authenticable | True |
| Encrypt | True |
| Interoperability | Description |
|---|---|
| Local | In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides. |
Security
| Information Flow Security | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
| Rating | Moderate | High | Moderate | |
| Basis | The operational state of field devices, if known to an attacker or individual with criminal intent, could be used to facilitate the commission of a crime. Individual devices may be more or less important in this context; for example knowing whether a security camera is operating is probably more relevant to the criminal than knowing if the DMS is operating, though the latter could still be useful info. Instances of this flow that are local minimize this risk however, so for these local flows Confidentiality is considered LOW. | If incorrect or changed, could lead to in incorrect rule distribution which in turn could lead to incorrect behavior by vehicles receiving the incorrect information. Might be MODERATE in some instances, but rated HIGH because the simplest use cases (e.g. higher speed limits) can lead to dangerous behavior. | Must be timely and available for most use cases, but receiving devices must have safe fallbacks anyway and the impact of not having this information is likely not catastrophic. | |
| Security Characteristics | Value |
|---|---|
| Authenticable | True |
| Encrypt | True |