Border Inspection System --> Traffic Management Center:
remote surveillance control

Definition
Included In
Communication Solutions
Characteristics
Security

Definitions

remote surveillance control (Information Flow): The control commands used to remotely operate another center's sensors or surveillance equipment so that roadside surveillance assets can be shared by more than one agency.

Border Inspection System (Source Physical Object): 'Border Inspection System' represents data systems used at the border for the inspection of people or goods. It supports immigration, customs (trade), agricultural, and FDA inspections as applicable. It includes sensors and surveillance systems to identify and classify drivers and their cargo as they approach a border crossing, the systems used to interface with the back-office administration systems and provide information on status of the crossing or events.

Traffic Management Center (Destination Physical Object): The 'Traffic Management Center' monitors and controls traffic and the road network. It represents centers that manage a broad range of transportation facilities including freeway systems, rural and suburban highway systems, and urban and suburban traffic control systems. It communicates with ITS Roadway Equipment and Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment (RSE) to monitor and manage traffic flow and monitor the condition of the roadway, surrounding environmental conditions, and field equipment status. It manages traffic and transportation resources to support allied agencies in responding to, and recovering from, incidents ranging from minor traffic incidents through major disasters.

Included In

This Triple is in the following Service Packages:

TM08: Traffic Incident Management System

This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:

This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:

border_remote_video_control

This Triple has the following triple relationships:

Relationship	Source	Destination	Flow
Interactive	Traffic Management Center	Border Inspection System	traffic images

Communication Solutions

US: TMDD - NTCIP Messaging (13)
(None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS) (43)

Solutions are sorted in ascending Gap Severity order. The Gap Severity is the parenthetical number at the end of the solution.

Selected Solution

US: TMDD - NTCIP Messaging

Solution Description

This solution is used within Canada and the U.S.. It combines standards associated with US: TMDD with those for C-C: NTCIP Messaging. The US: TMDD standards include upper-layer standards required to implement center-to-center communications with traffic management systems. The C-C: NTCIP Messaging standards include lower-layer standards that support partially secure communications between two centers as commonly used in the US.

ITS Application Entity ITE TMDD Vol 2			Click gap icons for more info.
Mgmt Bundle: SNMPv3 MIB W3C WSDL 1.1	Facilities ITE TMDD Vol 2 NTCIP 2306	Security Secure Session Alternatives
	TransNet IP Alternatives IETF RFC 9293
	Access Internet Subnet Alternatives

Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.

Characteristics

Characteristic	Value
Time Context	Recent
Spatial Context	Local
Acknowledgement	True
Cardinality	Unicast
Initiator	Source
Authenticable	True
Encrypt	True

Interoperability	Description
Local	In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides.

Security

Information Flow Security
	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability
Rating	Moderate	High	Moderate
Basis	Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. DISC: NYC believes this to be low: "This information is directly observable."	Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. From NYC: The information sent from TMC directly affect the ITS-RE speed "announcement".	Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH.. From NYC: The ITS-RE can work accordingly or in fail-safe if information is not available.

Security Characteristics	Value
Authenticable	True
Encrypt	True

Border Inspection System --> Traffic Management Center:remote surveillance control