Emergency Management Center --> Security Monitoring Equipment:
secure area surveillance control

Definitions

secure area surveillance control (Information Flow): Information used to configure and control audio and video surveillance systems used for transportation infrastructure security in secure areas. The provided information controls surveillance data collection, aggregation, filtering, and other local processing.

Emergency Management Center (Source Physical Object): The 'Emergency Management Center' represents systems that support incident management, disaster response and evacuation, security monitoring, and other security and public safety-oriented ITS applications. It includes the functions associated with fixed and mobile public safety communications centers including public safety call taker and dispatch centers operated by police (including transit police), fire, and emergency medical services. It includes the functions associated with Emergency Operations Centers that are activated at local, regional, state, and federal levels for emergencies and the portable and transportable systems that support Incident Command System operations at an incident. This Center also represents systems associated with towing and recovery, freeway service patrols, HAZMAT response teams, and mayday service providers.

It manages sensor and surveillance equipment used to enhance transportation security of the roadway infrastructure (including bridges, tunnels, interchanges, and other key roadway segments) and the public transportation system (including transit vehicles, public areas such as transit stops and stations, facilities such as transit yards, and transit infrastructure such as rail, bridges, tunnels, or bus guideways). It provides security/surveillance services to improve traveler security in public areas not a part of the public transportation system.

It monitors alerts, advisories, and other threat information and prepares for and responds to identified emergencies. It coordinates emergency response involving multiple agencies with peer centers. It stores, coordinates, and utilizes emergency response and evacuation plans to facilitate this coordinated response. Emergency situation information including damage assessments, response status, evacuation information, and resource information are shared The Emergency Management Center also provides a focal point for coordination of the emergency and evacuation information that is provided to the traveling public, including wide-area alerts when immediate public notification is warranted.

It tracks and manages emergency vehicle fleets using real-time road network status and routing information from the other centers to aid in selecting the emergency vehicle(s) and routes, and works with other relevant centers to tailor traffic control to support emergency vehicle ingress and egress, implementation of special traffic restrictions and closures, evacuation traffic control plans, and other special strategies that adapt the transportation system to better meet the unique demands of an emergency.

Security Monitoring Equipment (Destination Physical Object): 'Security Monitoring Equipment' includes surveillance and sensor equipment used to provide enhanced security and safety for transportation facilities or infrastructure. The equipment is located in non-public areas of transportation facilities (e.g. maintenance and transit yards), on or near non-roadway parts of the transportation infrastructure (e.g. transit railway and guideways), and in public areas (e.g., transit stops, transit stations, intermodal terminals). This equipment also includes surveillance and sensor equipment located on or near major roadway features such as bridges, tunnels, and interchanges, when the equipment's primary function is one of security and safety. If the primary function of the equipment is traffic surveillance or incident detection, then the surveillance or sensors would be covered as part of the 'ITS Roadway Equipment'. The surveillance equipment includes video (e.g. CCTV cameras) and/or audio systems. The sensor equipment includes threat sensors (e.g. chemical agent, toxic industrial chemical, biological, explosives, and radiological sensors), object detection (e.g. metal detectors), intrusion or motion detection, and infrastructure integrity monitoring (e.g. rail track continuity checking or bridge structural integrity monitoring). Limited processing of collected sensor and surveillance data is also included in this subsystem to support threat detection and classification.

Included In

This Triple is in the following Service Packages:

This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:

This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:

This Triple has the following triple relationships:

Communication Solutions

  • (None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS) (43)
Solutions are sorted in ascending Gap Severity order. The Gap Severity is the parenthetical number at the end of the solution.

Selected Solution

(None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS)

Solution Description

This solution is used within Australia, Canada, the E.U. and the U.S.. It combines standards associated with (None-Data) with those for I-I: Secure Internet (ITS). The (None-Data) standards include an unspecified set of standards at the upper layers. The I-I: Secure Internet (ITS) standards include lower-layer standards that support secure communications between ITS equipment using X.509 or IEEE 1609.2 security certificates.

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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.

Characteristics

Characteristic Value
Time Context Recent
Spatial Context Local
Acknowledgement True
Cardinality Unicast
Initiator Source
Authenticable True
Encrypt True


Interoperability Description
Local In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides.

Security

Information Flow Security
  Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Rating Moderate High Moderate
Basis Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. DISC: NYC believes this to be low: "This information is directly observable." Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. From NYC: The information sent from TMC directly affect the ITS-RE speed "announcement". Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH.. From NYC: The ITS-RE can work accordingly or in fail-safe if information is not available.


Security Characteristics Value
Authenticable True
Encrypt True