Registration Authority --> Location Obscurer Proxy:
certificate revocations
Definitions
certificate revocations (Information Flow): List of unexpired certificate identifiers that are no longer considered trustworthy by the CCMS.
Registration Authority (Source Physical Object): The 'Registration Authority' (RA) is a component of the CCMS that is the main point of contact for an end entity, and is responsible for provisioning the end entity with authorization and successor enrollment
Location Obscurer Proxy (Destination Physical Object): The 'location obscurer proxy' (LOP) is a component of the CCMS that is responsible for hiding location information of an end entity from the registration authority.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
- None
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
- None
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
- None
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
None |
Communication Solutions
- US: Security Credentials - Guaranteed Secure Internet (ITS) (3)
Selected Solution
Solution Description
ITS Application Entity
No Standard Needed |
Click gap icons for more info.
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Mgmt
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Facilities
IEEE 1609.2.1 |
Security
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TransNet
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Access
Internet Subnet Alternatives |
Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
Characteristic | Value |
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Time Context | Recent |
Spatial Context | Regional |
Acknowledgement | True |
Cardinality | Unicast |
Initiator | Source |
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | False |
Interoperability | Description |
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Regional | Interoperability throughout the geopolitical region is highly desirable, but if implemented differently in different transportation management jurisdictions, significant benefits will still accrue in each jurisdiction. Regardless, this Information Flow Triple should be implemented consistently within a transportation jurisdiction (i.e., the scope of a regional architecture). |
Security
Information Flow Security | ||||
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Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
Rating | Not Applicable | High | High | |
Basis |
Security Characteristics | Value |
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Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | False |