CCMS Manager System --> Root CA:
signed CTL
Definitions
signed CTL (Information Flow): A list of electors and the root certificate authorities that are trusted by a particular CCMS Manager, signed by the eligible electors.
CCMS Manager System (Source Physical Object): 'CCMS Manager System' refers to the component of the CCMS whose role is to govern the entire CCMS, including defining and enforcing the certificate and security policies applied to electors and root Cas.
Root CA (Destination Physical Object): A 'root certificate authority' (RCA) is a certificate authority that issues certificates for other entities and whose certificate was issued by itself.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
- None
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
- None
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
- None
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
None |
Communication Solutions
- US: Security Credentials - Guaranteed Secure Internet (ITS) (0)
Selected Solution
Solution Description
ITS Application Entity
No Standard Needed |
Click gap icons for more info.
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Mgmt
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Facilities
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Security
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TransNet
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Access
Internet Subnet Alternatives |
Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
Characteristic | Value |
---|---|
Time Context | Recent |
Spatial Context | Regional |
Acknowledgement | True |
Cardinality | Unicast |
Initiator | Source |
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | False |
Interoperability | Description |
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Regional | Interoperability throughout the geopolitical region is highly desirable, but if implemented differently in different transportation management jurisdictions, significant benefits will still accrue in each jurisdiction. Regardless, this Information Flow Triple should be implemented consistently within a transportation jurisdiction (i.e., the scope of a regional architecture). |
Security
Information Flow Security | ||||
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Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
Rating | Not Applicable | High | High | |
Basis |
Security Characteristics | Value |
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Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | False |